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NOTES
CLARIFYING THE SCOPE OF CIVIL

DiscovERY

UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES:

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

I. Introduction
The federal rulemakers have been in no hurry to change the broad, imaginative and effectively used discovery procedures which were adopted in 1938.
These have served the practicing bar and bench well. Yet, as can always be
expected, the procedures in vogue have outrun the statutory provisions - both
the customs of practicing lawyers and the judicial construction of the existing
statutes have expanded the rules far beyond their initial scope, or, in some
cases, so confused that scope that clarification is now a necessity. To resolve

the disputes in certain areas and the abuses that have come into existence in
others, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has met the challenge of the
times by proposing amendments to the existing federal rules on discovery and
.depositions.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the workhorse of the rulemaking
structure, is appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States, and consists
of attorneys, judges, and scholars.1 The proposals to be discussed here have
been submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States,2 which in turn will give them
full consideration, along with additional suggestions submitted from the bench
and bar. Pending any changes, and subsequent approval, they will then be
presented to the Judicial Conference itself, and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court
of the United States for final approval. It goes without saying that the renowned
authors of these proposals are their greatest assets, and that subsequent acceptance of them rests largely on the present text and the recommendations of the
Standing Committee.
The amendments contain significant changes in and clarifications of both
the scope and the mechanics of the existing discovery provisions, Federal Rules
26-37. This Note will speak only to the changes in -scope- specifically, what
can be discovered. It should be noted, however, that the developments in the
mechanical structure are no less substantial or important. It is in that area
that the Project for Effective Justice of the Columbia Law School carried out
an especially helpful field survey of discovery practice that showed the operations
of the discovery rules at the law office level.
A brief introduction into the rearrangement of the discovery rules will aid
readers in visualizing both the clarification intended by the amendments, and the
1 Among the members of this Committee are: Hon. Dean Acheson, Chairman, Judge
Wilfred Feinberg, Dean Charles W. Joiner, Prof. David W. Louisell, Judge Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr., Abraham E. Freedman, Esq., and Prof. Albert M. Sacks, Reporter.
2 The members of the Standing Committee are: Judge Albert B. Maris, Chairman,
William E. Foley, Secretary, Judge George H. Boldt, Peyton Ford, Esq., Dean Mason Ladd,
Prof. James Wm. Moore, J. Lee Rankin, Esq., Bernard G. Segal, Esq.,_,Prof. Charles Alan
Wright, and Judge J. Skelly Wright.
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area of inquiry to be covered by this Note. Under the existing rules, each discovery device is separate and self-contained in a particular rule.3 The problem
with this arrangement is that there is no natural location in the discovery rules for
provisions generally applicable to all discovery devices. This problem was not
too troublesome when there were only a few provisions governing discovery
generally, but there are now a series of amendments proposed to govern almost
all the discovery devices. Thus, the first important step is the development of
one rule which will address itself to discovery generally. Such is provided in
new Rule 26, which makes it a convenient vehicle for the inclusion of new
provisions dealing with the scope of discovery, and also for the inclusion of
sections on protective orders, sequence and timing of discovery, and supplementation of responses which have a similar general applicability. Particularly as to
scope, though, Rule 26 is significant. It contains a provision as to the general
scope of discovery4 and provisions on discoverability of insurance agreements,
trial preparation materials and trial preparation experts, all of which are topics
to be discussed in this Note.
The changes in scope of discovery are not restricted to Rule 26, however,
but are also to be found in the appropriate rules dealing with particular devices.
Among these, three deserve special discussion: (a) discovery of documents and
things and entry upon land under Rule 34, (b) medical and physical examinations under Rule 35, and (c) interrogatories and requests for admission under
Rules 33 and 36 respectively.
In speaking to the changes in the scope of discovery in the particular areas
mentioned above, this Note will proceed in two ways. First, with a thorough
analysis, it will consider the present rules and the state of the law which has
developed around them. It should be pointed out that, because the focus rests
on the changes in the rules, the discussion will consider the present rules and
judicial construction of them only in the context of those changes. In this
way the reader will not lose himself in discussion of the present, and, by spotlighting only the present law as it relates to a particular change, he can better
reflect on the merit of that change. Second, it will present, in almost every
instance, the text of the proposed amendment and, with the aid of the Advisory
Committee's Notes, it will discuss the position taken and the reasons for it.
At the outset, it should not be forgotten that, because we are dealing with
matters of procedure, clarifications of disputes arising in the lower courts most
3 For example, Rule 26 speaks to oral depositions, Rule 31 to written depositions, Rule
33 to interrogatories to parties, Rule 34 to discovery of documents, Rule 35 to mental or
physical examinations, and Rule 36 to admissions.
4 That provision reads as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure
for the United States District Courts relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 211, 2245 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments]. This provision is substantially the same
as existing Rule 26(b).
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often can be resolved by rulemaking rather than by decisional edict. It is with
this in mind that these attempts at change deserve initial praise.
II.

Discovery of Documents, Trial Preparation Materials and Experts

A. Rule 34-Discovery of Documents
At present, Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party,
with a court order, to obtain production or examination - to copy or photograph certain documents and things within the possession or control of another
party.5 The distinguishing trait of Rule 34 discovery is its requirement of a showing of "good cause" for production and inspection of all documents, whether
they be judicially classified as trial preparation materials or not. When dealing
with documents not prepared for trial, however, the modem judicial tendency
when construing the Rule has been to require merely a showing of relevancy
to the subject matter in issue in order to satisfy the "good cause" requirement.6
Still there are cases holding to a more restrictive view and requiring a showing
not only of relevancy, but also of necessity to the moving party.' The proposed
amendment is significant not for the language it adds to Rule 34, but for the
language it deletes.' As to scope, two significant changes are noteworthy.
First, the good cause requirement is eliminated.9 The modem tendency to require only a showing of relevancy to obtain production is recognized by language
adopted in the new general provision of the discovery rules, Rule 26, which
requires only that the discoverable matter be not privileged and that it be
"relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."'1 , That the
courts have developed a stricter notion of good cause for trial preparation
materials is recognized by separating these materials from Rule 34 documents
in an appropriate description. Second, the Rule extends to the testing and sampling
of tangible things and objects or operations on land11 - i.e., to matters of contemporary technology. As the comments to the amendments point out, "[I]f
the operation of a particular machine is the basis of a claim for negligent injury,
it will often be necessary to test its operating parts or to sample and test the
products it is producing."' 2

5 FED. R. Civ. P. 34.

6 See Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 "(S.D.N.Y. 1955),
where the court stated that "the greater number of courts considering the question of good
cause have decided that good cause is established when it appears that the papers sought are
relevant to the subject matter of the action" Id. at 277.
7 See, e.g., Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 215 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 928 (1955).
8 Proposed Amendments 255-56.
9 Id. A similar modification was proposed by the Advisory Committee in 1955 and has
been adopted in several states. See 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDua,
§ 791 (Wright ed. 1961).
10 Proposed Amendments 224. Unlike existing Rule 34, the amendment will operate
extrajudicially to conform to existing legal practice.
11 Id. at 256.
12 Advisory Committee's Note, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43
F.R.D. 211, 257 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Committee's Notes].
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B. Trial Preparation:Materials
In 1947, in the now famous case of Hickman v. Taylor," the Supreme
Court set up a qualified immunity for the discovery of materials prepared by
an attorney for trial. The Court stated:
Here is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to
secure written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections
prepared or formed 'by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal
duties. As such, it falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes
the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal
claims. Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.' 4
Though the Hickman case did not speak to Rule 34 or its "good cause" requirement, lower courts were quick to define Rule 34 "good cause" in the Hickman
manner not only for trial material prepared by a lawyer, but also for trial material prepared by non-lawyers. Thus the present trend is to read "good cause"
in two ways: when asking for non-trial preparation materials as if it means a
showing of relevancy, and when asking for trial preparation materials, no matter
by whom prepared, as if it means a showing of necessity. And so, though a
party may show that certain relevant documents were not prepared by a lawyer,
but were prepared by non-lawyers for litigation, he may not succeed in having
these documents produced unless he shows "good cause" amounting to necessity.

A good example of this is Guilford National Bank v. Southern Railway Company " where, upon a request for the discovery of statements of witnesses obtained
by claims agents, the Fourth Circuit, disregarding the "work product" question,
said:
The specific requirement of good cause would be meaningless if good
cause could be sufficiently established by merely showing that the desired
materials are relevant, for the relevancy standard has already been imposed
by Rule 26(b). Thus, by adding the words "showing good cause therefor,"
the Rules indicate that there must be greater showing of need under Rules
34 and 35 than under the other discovery rules.:'

The question of the Hickman doctrine itself extending to other areas has
arisen and the courts have split over the answer. The issue has been advanced
as to whether the work product immunity extends only to statements and other
material obtained by trial counsel, or whether it gives a qualified protection
also to statements obtained by claims agents, investigators or insurers. Division
among the courts of appeal is shown by contrasting the decision of the Third
Circuit in Alltmont v. United States7 with that of the Fifth Circuit in Southern
Railway Company v. Campbell.8 The Third Circuit, in striking an analogy
between claims agents and attorneys, argued:
13 329 U.S. 495 "(1947). The discovery there used was an interrogatory with a request
that the documents asked about be attached.
14 Id. at 510.
15 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1964).
16 Id. at 924.
17 177 F.2d 971 (3d Oir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
18 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962).
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[We can see no logical basis for making any distinction between statements
of witnesses secured by a party's trial counsel personally in preparation for
trial and those obtained by others for the use of the party's trial counsel.
In each case the statements are obtained in preparation for litigation and
ultimately find their way into trial counsers files for his use ...
The
adverse party could certainly have no greater or different need for copies
of the statements in the one case than in the other. In each case he has
had the same opportunity through interrogatories to learn all the pertinent
facts which his opponent has gleaned from the witnesses as well as the
names and addresses of those witnesses so that he himself may interview
them or secure their deposition if he wishes.' 9
The court proceeded to argue that a failure to apply the "work product" doctrine to these statements would in the end discriminate against the party whose
attorney delegates part of his work in preparing for trial to others and in favor
of the party whose counsel does all the work himself.20 But the Fifth Circuit,
in Campbell, failed to recognize this logic, though it did not fear to face the
challenge of the "work product" doctrine extension which had been made by
the Fourth Circuit in Guilford. It interpreted strictly, and, holding that the
statements taken by the claims agents are not generally considered to be the
'"work product" of a lawyer in preparation for the defense, allowed their production.2 '
Commentators, while recognizing the force of the arguments made in
Alltmont, have pointed out that the Hickman case rests on a policy decision,
insuring the independence of the lawyer and, indirectly, the adversary system 2 2
As to the notion that failure to extend the doctrine would favor the lawyer who
does the work himself, the Court in Hickman refused to consider an analogous
problem of whether a particular rule would favor corporate defendants as against
injured persons. 3
There is a similar division in the district courts. With respect to statements
made by an insured to his insurer and subsequently conveyed to an attorney,
one court has said that such were not part of the "work product" of a lawyer
within the meaning of Hickman, 4 while another has thought the opposite.25
A split as to statements obtained by investigators for the insurance company
likewise exists 20
The proposed amendment, written as a general provision governing discovery in subsection (b) (3) of Rule 26, and entitled "Trial Preparation:
Materials" reads:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation
19 Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
967 (1950).
20 Id.
21 309 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1962).

22 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 315 (1963).
23 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
24 See Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959).
25 See Burns v. Mulder, 20 F.R.D. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
26 Compare Burke v. United States, 32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D. N.Y. 1963), with Snyder v.
United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[October, 1968]

of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing of good cause therefor, except that a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously
given by27the party seeking the statement may be obtained without such a
showing.
This provision thus resolves the conflicts discussed above. Considered with the
improvements to Rule 34, the two amendments have accomplished two significant clarifications: first, they have eliminated the confusion arising from
using the good cause provision of Rule 34 for two distinct types of materials;
second, the separate and distinct trial preparation materials provision has incorporated not only the Hickman rule itself, but by expanding the scope to
include trial preparation materials from non-lawyers, it has encompassed both
the decisions like Alltmont which extend the Hickman rule beyond lawyers, and
those like Guilford, which, while not recognizing explicitly an extension, prefer
the same result by relying on a strict reading of Rule 34 for production of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. The requirement of a showing of
good cause for materials prepared by an attorney and for materials prepared
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial by or for a party or any
representative acting on his behalf reflects the view that the lawyer's mental
impressions should be protected, that each side should be encouraged to prepare
independently, and that one side should not automatically have the benefit
of the detailed preparatory work of the other side 8 But the commentaries
also point out that the new good cause provision can still be meaningfully applied
so as not to wholly prevent production of materials prepared for trial. Factors
to be considered in satisfying the standard are the importance of the materials
in the preparation of a case and the difficulty of obtaining them by other means,
or the inability to get the substantial equivalent by other means either because
a witness is hostile, has a lapse of memory, is changing his story, or the story
itself cannot be as "fresh" as when given at the time of the occurrence.2 9
A final conflict exists in the case law regarding the discovery by a party
of his own statement. The situation would seem to arise frequently in personal
injury litigation where the eventual defendant obtains a statement from the
injured person before the person has retained counsel, and subsequently refuses
to give the party a copy of his statement. For example, in one situation, two
weeks after an accident in a Safeway store, the victim, without counsel from
an attorney, gave a statement to an attorney for the insurer of the store owner
before either party had begun litigation. Confronted with a request for production of this statement, the court stated that such a demand lacked "any
real reason or necessity for the production, and there is nothing to show that a
denial of production will unfairly prejudice the plaintiff or cause him undue
hardship or injustice." 3 Yet the Fourth Circuit, confronted with a similar
situation, has held otherwise:
27
28

29
30

Proposed Amendments 225.
See Committee's Notes 231-32.

Id. at-232.
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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The document was requested, and its production ordered, on the basis
that there was "good cause" therefor, arising out -of the circumstances
under which the statement was taken and the lapse of time thereafter. If
fairness, alone, does not require that a cooperative employee be furnished
a copy of a statement he supplies, when unrepresented by counsel and still
in confinement with his injuries, -thelapse of many months and the dimming
of memory provides much reason for his counsel to examine any substantial
contemporary declaration or admissions. Aside from what assistance it
may be in the preparation of a case for trial, the production of such a
statement, after the lapse of time, permits a more realistic appraisal of
cases and should stimulate the disposition of controversies without trials.ul
Commentator Moore feels that an amendment should resolve the issue,
but that even under the rules as they stand and under the Hickman case, a party
to a lawsuit who has given a statement at a time when he was not represented by
counsel and who was not provided a copy of the statement by his adversary
should be entitled, without more, to a copy of that statement.3 2 The proposed
amendment takes this position,"3 and its validity seems unquestionable. There
are noteworthy reasons for this. First, unlike that of another witness, a partywitness's statement may be admissible in evidence against him as an admission
by a party;' the tendency of jurors to be unduly inflhenced by such admissions
makes it important for a party to be aware of the extent to which he has committed himself so that he may honestly explain them. And second, lapse of
memory, inaccuracy because of passage of time, and the failure to have an
attorney present are decisive and just considerations. State statutes have taken
this approach 3 and for the Federal Rules to do otherwise would only serve those
potential litigants quick enough to interview others who have been less hasty
in retaining an attorney.
C. Trial Preparation:Experts
The present rules do not expressly answer the question, nor have the courts
provided any clear assurance, as to whether a litigant can obtain discovery of
information held by an adverse party's expert. Certain decisions have denied
discovery of such information altogether as privileged. " The Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor makes it difficult, however, to sustain the argument
that opinions of an expert, although procured by counsel, are within the attorneyclient privilege. While the precise issue considered in Hickman was the right
31 New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1957).
32 See 4 J. MooRE, FEaDRAL PRAcTicE 1 26.23 [8.-4] (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as MooRB].
33 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
34 See 0. McCoRMICK, EVMFDNCE § 239 (1954). It is responsive to this point to quote
Justice Jackson's concurring pronouncement in Hickman v. Taylor that "it seems clear and
long has been recognized that discovery should provide a party access to anything that is
evidence in his case." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947).
35 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 602.01 (1947); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. § 3101 (e) (McKinney
1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.33 (1960). For a further discussion of a party's right to
discover his own statement, see Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HIRv. L. Rnv.
940, 1039 (1961).
36 See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petro. Prod. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 685-86
(D.R.I. 1959).
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to discover statements of ordinary witnesses, significant note should be made
of the broad language used in disposing of the issue of privilege:
[T]he protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information
which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in
anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda,
briefs, communications and other writings prepared by counsel for his
own use in prosecuting his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to
writings which reflect
an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
37
or legal theories.
Thus, if memoranda prepared by an attorney himself are not privileged, it does
not seem that reports prepared for him by experts can be so classified. Just as
in the Hickman decision, however, the non-privileged nature of the information
is not conclusive as to whether or not discovery should be allowed.3"
Theories allowing for discovery of such expert information have been
similarly advanced. It has been argued that, since the expert can be asked on
cross-examination at the trial the basis for his conclusions, discovery should be
allowed since "discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which dis'
closure can be compelled from the time of the trial to the period preceding it."39
Yet, as has been frequently pointed out, the fact that a party's expert might be
compelled to testify at the trial does not mean that the opposing party has a right
to compel his testimony at the pre-trial stage. It is an oversimplification to say
that discovery simply advances the stage at which disclosure can be compelled,
for the scope of discovery before trial oftentimes is far broader than the scope
40
of testimony at the trial.
More often than not, discovery has been denied for reasons of unfairness
to the party who engaged the expert. In United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land,41
it was stated that "by the more modem and better-reasoned cases, discovery in
this area, if denied, is denied on the ground of unfairness."' A more poignant
expression of this theory was given in Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation,4" where a third party defendant sought to take the deposition of an
expert who had been engaged by the defendant to make tests of an allegedly
defective airplane engine cylinder. The court stated:
To permit a party by deposition to examine an expert of the opposite
party before trial, to whom the latter has obligated himself to pay a considerable sum of money, would be equivalent to taking another's property
without making any compensation therefor. To permit parties to examine
the expert witnesses of the other party in land condemnation and patent
actions, where the evidence nearly all comes from expert witnesses, would
cause confusion and probably would violate that provision of Rule 1 which

37

38

329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).

MOORE 1126.24, at 1528.

39 See Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548, 550 (E.D. Wisc. 1947).
40 See MooRE 1 26.24, at 1529.
41 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963).
42 Id. at 597.
43 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
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provides that the rules "shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and
44
inexpensive determination of every action."
Of course, a theory of unfairness cannot always operate on a one-way street.
In some instances justice will lie on the side of the party to whom knowledge
of all relevant facts is unavailable, even though in most cases a party can obtain

the information by consulting his own experts.
The fundamental proposition of all discovery-that mutual knowledge
of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation
well beyond dispute. Yet a more practical fact is also beyond contradiction, i.e., that litigants often pay experts substantial fees for obtaining their
advice, and it is financially oppressive to permit a party to take advantage of
his opponent by obtaining that party's expert witness's opinion before trial without paying any part of the cost. In these cases, then, the public interest in facilitation of litigation meets head-on the personal interest in spending large sums
to win an appropriate verdict. A balancing process appears to be the only adequate answer. It is true that some showing of good cause is implicit in those
cases which speak to the "fairness of the situation." For example, in Colden v.
R. J. Schofield Motors,45 discovery was allowed because the expert's statement
was based upon an inspection and examination of the disassembled, automobile
involved in the suit, and because the defendant was not in a position to obtain
the information elsewhere; but in Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres,
Inc.," a plaintiff was denied leave to take the deposition of an accountant who
had been engaged by defendants to examine plaintiff's books in order to ascertain what facts the accountant might have discovered or might claim to have
discovered in his examination of the books. The Dipson court pointed out that
the books were in the possession of the plaintiff, who could have made, and in
part had made, his own examination of them. 7
There is some tendency in the cases to distinguish between discovery of
the facts found by an expert and the conclusions he has formed, allowing the
former but not the latter - which undoubtedly are of greater worth to a party. 8
Thus, in Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Company, the court pointed out that conclusions are not objective facts (the primary goal of the parties), and that they
are not otherwise unavailable to a party because he can draw his own conclusions
from his facts" But the difficulty of separating fact from opinion is burdensome,
and this attempted distinction has been sharply criticized. 0
It is to the trend towards a consideration of fairness and to a requirement
of an inherent good cause for the requested discovery that the proposed amendment to Rule 34 addresses itself. 1 Subsection (b) (4) (A) reads:
-is

44 Id. at 23.
45 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
46

8 F.R.D. 313 "(W.D.N.Y. 1948).

47

Id.

48

See, e.g., Currie v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 660

49

15 F.R.D. 376, 378 '(D.N.J. 1954).

(D.Mass. 1959).

50 For a good discussion, see Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. Rv. 455, 473 (1962).
51 An amendment to Rule 30(b) proposed in 1946 attempting to prohibit discovery of
any part of a "writing" obtained in preparation for trial "that peflects . . . the conclusions of
an expert" was not adopted. See MooRE f 26.24, at 1530.
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Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule and
Rule 35(b) a party may discover facts known or opinions held by an
expert retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or preparationfor trial only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery is unable without undue hardship to obtain facts and opinions
on the same subject by other means or upon a showing of other exceptional
circumstances indicating that denial of discovery would cause manifest
injustice.52
This subdivision speaks to the experts retained or specially committed in relation to trial preparation, and therefore does not limit the discovery of matters
acquired from a person outside of trial preparation even though he happens
to be an expert;5" but it does preclude discovery from experts who are even
informally consulted in preparation for trial. It is important to understand that
this subdivision pertains broadly to any form of discovery from those experts so
described. In allowing discovery of both facts and opinions or conclusions, the
amendment does not adopt the arguments mentioned in the Walsh case, though
the flexibility of the undue hardship and manifest injustice tests will surely allow
4
more discovery of facts than opinions.1
There are situations where the opinions or techniques of experts may be
central to the litigation. Among these are food and drug, patent, and condemnation cases, which present complex and troublesome issues as to which
expert testimony is likely to be determinative. In United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc.,"5 an action by the federal government seeking an injunction
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 6 against the introduction into
interstate commerce of certain capsules on the ground that defendants were
violating the Act by misbranding the drug, the court held for discovery. The
opinions of expert witnesses and certain interrogatories of the United States
relating to these experts were allowed, but the defendant was required only to
describe and identify the written opinions of the expert witnesses, and not to
analyze and summarize them. And in United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land,5"
a condemnation proceeding, where it appeared that the appraisal reports on
realty were obtained by the government for the express purpose of determining
compensation which would have to be paid for the realty, that the reports were
in the possession and control of the government, that neither the reports nor
their authors were otherwise available, and that there was nothing to indicate
that the reports were privileged matter, the defendant was entitled to inspect,
copy, or photostat the documents.5 8 The reasons for allowing discovery, particularly in these situations, is evident: expanded discovery allows for improved crossexamination and rebuttal at trial. The lawyer, even with the help of his own
experts, frequently cannot anticipate the particular approach his adversary's

52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Proposed Amendments 225.
See Committee's Notes 234.
Id.
26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
52 STAT. 1040 (1938).
13 F.R.D. 19 '(E.D.N.Y. 1952).
Id. at 21.
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expert will take or the data on which he will base his opinion.59 Still, there are
similar cases in which the strongest arguments for discovery should have been
recognized, yet the courts have continued to refuse disclosure."0 To remedy
these, subdivision (b) (4) (B) is proposed:
As an alternative or in addition to obtaining discovery under subdivision (b)(4) (A) of this rule, a party by means of interrogatoriesmay
require any other party (i) to identify each person whom the other party
expects to call as an expert witness at trial, and (ii) to state the subject
matter on which the expert is expected to testify. Thereafter, any party
may discover from the expert or the other party facts known or opinions
held by the expert which are relevant to the stated subject matter. Discovery of the expert's opinions and the grounds therefor is restricted to
those previously given or those to be given on direct examination at trial."'
Though this section is especially appropriate for cases where expert testimony is
the key to the trial and where many experts testify, the provision is also made
applicable to situations where only a single expert takes the stand."2 The safeguards in the amendment are provided to minimize the fear that one side will
benefit unduly from another's preparation. Discovery is limited to trial witnesses
and may be obtained only at a time when the parties know who their expert
witnesses will be. And, as a practical matter, a party must have prepared his

own case in advance of that time, for he can hardly hope to build his case out
of his opponent's experts. In addition, discovery is limited to those opinions
which have been previously given by the expert or which he will give on direct
examination. The court, at the same time, has ample power to regulate both
the time
and scope of discovery and to see and correct any abuses which may
63
ajse.

It must be remembered that both of these subdivisions, while they may overlap, are separated for specific purposes. The first speaks to the discovery of
specially employed or retained experts' information, and allows for this only
upon satisfaction of stringent standards. The second provision is more narrow,
for it is applicable only to the expert who is to be a witness at trial, and discovery
there is only by interrogatory to the adverse party himself with inquiry limited
to the identity of the expert and to the subject matter of which he is to testify.
59 In Franks v. National Dairy Products Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966), the
court stated:
In almost every case where expert testimony is involved, the conclusions of the
experts and the tests and assumptions which support the experts' opinions, will be
the areas where issues exist and, decisions frequently turn on the experts' testimony.. . . Without discover, such evidence and issues will be unknown to opposing
counsel until it is too late to effectively cross-examine an expert or prepare rebuttal
evidence. More importantly, unless the position of each party is known along with
the basis for taking such position, no intelligent evaluation can be made for settlement purposes. Id. at 237.
For an additional comment, see McGlothlin, Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases
for United States Judges: Some Practical Problems in Proof of Economy, Scientific and
Technical Facts, 23 F.R.D. 319, 467 (1958).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1959),
and United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
61 Proposed Amendments 225-26.
62 See Committee's Notes 235, which indicate that this procedure had been earlier expressed in the decision of Knighton v. Villian & Fassio, 39 F.R.D. 11 (D. Md. 1965).
63 Committee's Notes 235.
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Then discovery procedures can be started with the expert, by any method, but
again restricted only to those opinions given or to be given on direct examination.
A minimum protection to the paying party is thus afforded.
A maximum protection is provided in subdivision (b) (4) (C). It has been
a common suggestion and fear in this area that is it undisputedly unfair to permit
one side to obtain, without cost, the benefit of an expert's work for which the
other side has paid a substantial sum. To ameliorate this fear, the following
is proposed:
The court may require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert
a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery, and with respect to discovery permitted under subdivision (b)(4)(4) of this rule, require a party to pay another party a fair portion of the fees and expenses
incurredby the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert."'
The court may issue the order for sharing another party's fees as a condition to
discovery, i.e., as a consideration for the party seeking the order, or it may delay
it until after discovery is completed. The amendment will provide compensation
to an expert discovered under procedures in subdivision (b) (4) (A) or
(b) (4) (B), or to the party employing the non-witness expert from whom valuable information might be obtained by inquiry under (b) (4) (A). In its entirety, this provision, by imposing an additional burden upon the judiciary,
eliminates the main obstacle to discovery in this area, and aids the entire amendment by striking an appropriate balance between personal pecuniary interests
and the public's drive towards effective, open, and proper litigation.
III. Discovery of Contents of Insurance Policies
The decisions under present Rule 26(b) are sharply divided on the issue
of whether, in the ordinary negligence case, it is proper to require a party to
disclose whether he has insurance, the name of the company, the limits of liability,
and the terms of the policy. Where insurance would be provable at trial, it is
entirely clear that the plaintiff may ascertain the facts of insurance by discovery.6"
In most cases, though, where insurance information is inadmissible at trial, the
plaintiff is interested in it only so that he may ascertain whether he will be able
to collect any judgment that he may obtair
The reasons given, both by commentators and judges, for allowing discovery are numerous, and are frequently mentioned together. Among these are:
(1) that there exists no relevancy to the issues of liability and damages in such
an inquiry, and, even though the insurer may be liable after judgment is entered,
there is no reason to conclude relevancy and allow discovery at the commencement of the action; (2) that such matter is neither admissible as evidence at
trial nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; (3) that this form of discovery would invade the defendant's
64

Proposed Amendments 226.

65 See Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), where the existence of insurance was discoverable to show ownership and control of the vehicle in possession.
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right to privacy before any determination of liability; and, (4) that
discovery might become the vehicle for making full inquiry into all the
confidential financial affairs of any luckless defendant. Those allowing for this
type of discovery have spoken and argued just as strongly: (1) that such would

promote the objectives of the Federal Rules to secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"; (2) that it would allow parties a
realistic appraisal of the value of their cases in advance of trial; (3) that the
insurance company is the real defendant since it defends the action, conducts
the investigation and negotiates any settlement; (4) that allowing discovery of
insurance coverage would eliminate the possibility of fraudulent settlements
obtained by a false disclosure concerning insurance coverage; (5) that the
beneficiary stands in the place of the insured, or the contract relationship between the insurer and the insured inures to the benefit of an injured party; (6)
that, unlike other assets which are often listed as public records, there is no way
of obtaining knowledge of liability insurance coverage. 6 Perhaps the most frequently mentioned argument is that such discovery will promote settlements and
thereby relieve court calendar congestion.6 7 Yet even this contention - that

knowledge of policy existence and limits will make settlements easy ably answered:

has been

It is undoubtedly true . . . that low insurance limits will expedite settlements. But it is likewise true that disclosure of high insurance limits will
retard, if not prevent, settlement. Human nature, being what it is, it is
not unreasonable to assume that, in the eyes of a plaintiff, the value of his
case will 8increase in proportion to the amount of insurance coverage
available.
In general, plaintiff's lawyers have eagerly sought such discovery and insurance

lawyers have just as eagerly fought it. In 1959, the Insurance Law Journal,
66 These reasons are suggested throughout the following well-written decisions: Cook v.
Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966); Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont.
1961); Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 '(D.N.J. 1962); Clauss v. Danker, 264 F.
Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); and in
these commentaries: Frank, Discovery and Insurance Coverage, 1959 INS. L.J. 281; Fournier,
Pre-Trial Discovery of Insurance Coverage and Limits, 28 FoRD. L. Rav. 215 (1959); Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits in Liability Policies in Automobile Tort Cases, 10 ALA. L.
Rav. 355 (1958); Note, supra note 35, at 1018.
67 See Clauss v. Danker, 264 F. Supp. 246, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the court
articulately argued:
This court has witnessed the dismal waste of time and effort, both on the part of
the parties and the court, in cases where an early disclosure of limited policy limits
would have led to prompt settlements that were not reached until the eve of trial,
when such information was first revealed after needless pretrial discovery and preparation for trial. Aside from such unnecessary consumption of time and effort
resulting from inability to learn such crucial information until the very last minute,
the effect frequently is to disrupt the court's schedule and cause loss of trial time
for many needy prospective litigants.
68 Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D.N.J. 1962). Another court has
responded similarly:
The law favors compromise settlements, but not at the expense of giving one party
an advantage over the other in bringing about those settlements. But, we are not
so sure that the giving to plaintiffs the limits of a defendant's liability insurance
policy will bring about more compromise settlements than will the withholding of
such information. Oftentimes cases are not settled because plaintiffs ask for greater
damages than their cases justify. Compromise settlement is not the aim of the
discovery rules. Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389, 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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recognizing that the settlement argument can cut both ways, stated that a survey
of judges and decisions showed that the trend was in the direction of barring
such discovery.69 If a numerical count of courts and decisions taking a certain
position is a proper test for the validity of such a position, then the Journal's
implications may be accepted.
Analogy has been successfully made to the Financial Responsibility Acts
enacted in some jurisdictions which not only require owners and operators of
motor vehicles to maintain liability insurance, but also establish minimum requirements for limits of liability. The increases in the number of automobiles
in use and in the number of motor vehicle accidents have resulted in a stringency
in regulations and in protective measures for the benefit of the public. Speaking
to the discovery of these policies a federal district court said:
From the tenor and purpose of such legislation it is obvious that such
insurance policies are definitely relevant to the subject matter of pending
actions growing out of accidents covered by such policies, especially in view
of the fact that this legislation apparently would require the defendant to
disclose to the state authority the information concerning the7 0insurance
which plaintiffs seek, and this would be a matter of public record.
In a state case, the court allowed discovery of a policy in light of the Safety
Responsibility Act whose "ultimate object is to provide compensation for innocent persons who might be injured through faulty operation of motor
vehicles."'"
Constitutional protagonists have argued that to require the defendant to
disclose the amount of an insurance policy would constitute an unreasonable
search and seizure of his property in violation of the right guaranteed him under
the fourth amendment of the Constitution; that to require such disclosure would
deprive him of his property without due process of law; and that this would
abridge his privileges and immunities under article IV, section 2, or would be
a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Neither the Supreme Court nor
any of the federal courts of appeal have passed on these issues, and the district
courts and state courts which have spoken to the questions have not given any
substantial answer. From these latter cases, however, it must be concluded that
no court has said that the discovery of insurance is unconstitutional. 2
The policy considerations mentioned above have surely gone beyond an
interpretation of the language of the existing discovery rules. As the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey said:
The rule, as presently written, does not .

.

. permit discovery of insurance

69 See Frank, supra note 65, at 314.
70 Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4, 6 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
71 Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 516, 345 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1959). The
Illinois Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 238, 145 N.E.2d 588,
592-93 (1957), made a similar recognition:
Thus, under our statutes, as in California, liability insurance i& not merely a
private matter for the sole knowledge of the carrier and the insured, but is also for
the benefit of persons injured by the negligent operation of insured's motor vehicle.
72 For a particularly well-analyzed discussion of these allegations of unconstitutionality,
see Note, Discovery-Privilege, Relevancy, and Constitutionality in the Discovery of Automobile Liability Insurance under the Federal Rules, 34 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 78 (1958).
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coverage in advance of a judicial determination of liability or damages in
a negligence action. If disclosure of insurance coverage is thought to be
desirable, the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure
73
should be amended to allow such discovery.

Without stretching the language of the discovery provisions by judicial construction, state courts have similarly called for amendments."4 The Advisory
Committee resolves the issue in favor of disclosure in subsection (b):
(2) Insurance Agreements; A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse
for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning the
insurance
agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence
75
at trial.

The commentaries state that the amendment will allow the parties to make the
same realistic appraisal of the case, though it may not induce settlement and
avoid protracted litigation."6 Insurance coverage is the limit of general inquiry
under the amendment - and is to be distinguished from other assets - because
it is obtained for the very purpose involved in the suit, it is available only from
the defendant or his insurer, it does not involve a significant invasion of privacy,
and, most importantly, because the insurance company most often controls the
litigation. The words "may be liable" in the provision will require even an insurance company contesting its liability under a policy to disclose. In no instance,
as is clearly pointed out, does discovery make the facts concerning insurance
coverage admissible in evidence. 7
IV. Extension of Medical Examinations Under Rule 35
Existing Rule 35 provides for the obtaining of a court order for the mental
or physical examination of a party when the mental or physical condition is in
controversy." Even this simple provision has not gone without judicial gloss.
Though the rule specifically applies only to parties, there has been considerable controversy as to whether a court may order persons other than parties
to submit to such examinations. In many types of litigation the mental or physical condition of a person not formally a party to a suit is of vital importance.
For example, when a parent sues for the loss of services of his injured child or
a husband seeks recovery for the loss of companionship and service of his in73

Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476, 480 (D.N.J. 1962).

The district court in

Clauss v. Danker, though denying the notion for discovery under the present Rules, did so

"with reluctance and with the desire that the Rules be amended to permit such discovery".
Clauss v. Danker, 264 F. Supp. 246, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
74 See, e.g., Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 562, 68 N.W.2d 649, 658 (1955):
[I]t would be far better to amend the rules so as to state what may and what may
not be done in that field than to stretch the present discovery rules so as to accomplish something which the language of the rules does not permit.

75 Proposed Amendments 225.
76 Committee's Notes 229-30.
77 Id.
78 FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
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jured wife,79 the physical condition of the child or wife is the exact issue around
which the controversy centers. Courts have often, despite the rule's language,
construed "party" in a liberal manner. In Beach v. Beach,"° an action by a wife
for maintenance in which she alleged that she was pregnant by her husband, the
husband counterclaimed for divorce on the ground of adultery and moved that
the court order both the wife and her newly born child to submit to a bloodgrouping test in order to determine paternity. The court held, emphasizing that
the mother's and child's interests were alike, that "one who is not a party in
form may be, for various purposes, a party in substance"' and thus found the
child a party within the meaning of Rule 35(a). The case also presented the
question whether in a blood-grouping test for non-paternity the "physical condition" was in controversy so as to satisfy the rule. This the court decided in the
affirmative, stating that "dearly the characteristics of one's blood which are
expressed in terms of red and white corpuscles, or of haemoglobin, are part of
one's physical condition." 2 To the extent that this stretches the meaning of Rule
35(a) which seems to speak to the situation of a physical or mental condition
itself being the controversy, and not merely evidence of another controversy (as
with blood-grouping tests), a new amendment seems in order. It has also been
argued that when one is suing for a declaratory judgment as to his derivative
citizenship," with his father acting as his guardian ad litem, Rule 35 may be
employed to compel the father to submit to a blood-grouping test if he wishes
to continue in his capacity as guardian ad litem. Yet this argument was rejected
in a number of cases in which claims of citizenship were involved and a blood
test would have been useful in proving or disproving the claim, when the courts
held that relatives of the would-be citizen were not parties, and therefore could
not be compelled to submit to such a test." The interpretation of the term party
as used in the Beach opinion was noted in the Supreme Court case of Schlagenhaul v. Holder,8 5 but the Court avoided any intimation as to its correctness. In
that case, the Court dealt with the rule's requirement of a showing of "good
cause" to obtain an examination, holding that such a requirement (which remains under the proposed amendment) could not be satisfied by a mere showing
of relevance to the case. 6
Extension of the rule in other situations has not been readily available. In
Kell v. Denver Tramway Corporation, a plaintiff in a personal injury action
was unable to have the vision of the defendant bus driver examined even though
the latter was allegedly color-blind. It appears that in this type of case, it would
be most desirable to order a physical examination of an agent of the defendant.
79 See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1291 '(1958).
80 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
81 Id. at 481.
82 Id.
83 This right is based on the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 235,
(1952) which provides that persons born abroad to American citizens shall themselves be
deemed nationals and citizens of the United States.
84 See, e.g., Fong Sih Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955) and Dulles v. Quan
Yoke Fong, 237 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1956).
85 379 U.S. 104, 115 (1964).
86 Id. at 121.
87 Civil No. A-81314, County Ct. Denver, Colo., Div. 4 (1953).
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Though inherent power has been claimed to permit such examinations,88 it is
doubtful whether this is proper in a federal court, especially since there was no
inherent power prior to the adoption of Rule 35.89
That justice would require certain persons other than parties to submit to
examinations in actions brought for loss of services of a relative, in paternity
suits, agency situations, and derivative citizenship cases seems undeniable. The
proposed amendment to Rule 35 so speaks:
(a) Order for Examination. When the mental or physical condition
(including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or
under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the
action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician or to produce for examination the person in his
custody or legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good
cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all
parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of
the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be madeY'
Extension to "a person in the custody or under the legal control of party" embodies solutions to all but the agency situation referred to above. It is perhaps
unfortunate that the Committee has not included this situation, dismissing its
failure to do so with the comment that "[p]rovisions relating to employees in the
State statutes and rules cited above appear to have been virtually unused."'"
There may be some suggestion that the Supreme Court might even find such an
extension unacceptable. In 1955, the former Advisory Committee proposed to
amend Rule 35 (a) to extend it to cases in which the mental or physical condition or the blood relationship of a party, or of an agent or a person in the custody
or under the legal control of a party is in controversy.9 2 Although a number of
states have enacted such a provision,9" this amendment, like all other amendments proposed that year, was not adopted. Further, mention of the pronounced
feeling of the Court in 1941 to physical examinations in general is worth consideration. In a decision at that time, the Supreme Court upheld present Rule
35 as a valid exercise of the Rules Enabling Act. 4 Yet four justices dissented,
with Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking:
So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy
in a matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization
to formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business
on the civil side of the federal courts. I deem a requirement as to the invasion of the person to stand on a very different footing from questions per88 See Dinsel v. Penn. R.R., 144 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
89 Lack of inherent power was stated in Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250
(1891).
90 Proposed Amendments 257.

91

Committee's Notes 259.

92

For further discussion of this proposal, -ee Note, Physical Examination of Non-Parties

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 IA. L. REv. 375, 380-83 (1958).
93 See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PRo. CODE, § 2032 (West Supp. 1967); N.Y. Civ. P Ac. § 3121

(McKinney 1963); and ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110A, § 215 (Smith-Hurd, Spec. Pamphlet,
1968).
94 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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taining to the discovery of documents, pre-trial procedure and other devices
for the expeditious, economic and fair conduct of litigation.95
If this feeling is at all prevalent on the Court today, it is questionable whether
it would approve an extension of physical examinations to persons not parties,
remote from the litigation, without a good deal of disagreement."
V. Rule 33 Interrogatories to Matters of Opinion and Conclusion
Rule 33 today details a procedure by which an adverse party may be required to provide written answers to relevant written questions submitted to
him." This procedure is an alternative to the oral deposition. The deposition, on
the basis of confrontation of a witness and immediacy of response, appears more
advantageous to an inquiring party; but the interrogatory does have the characteristic of being less expensive and can be used efficiently to obtain answers
to questions not normally in dispute. The scope of examination under Rule 33
is identical to that of the other discovery devices, but the rule is still not without
its own problems. The foremost question is whether interrogatories may be used
to ascertain opinions, contentions, and conclusions of the adverse party. As one
commentator has ably put it, "[t]he decisions on the propriety of interrogatories
inquiring about opinion, contentions, and conclusions are extremely numerous
and quite inconsistent."9 8 That the proposed amendment is meant to resolve
this confusion must be clear, but it is worthwhile to review some of this confusion
in the case law in order to see its reflection on the committee's proposal, and the
response that the practicing bar should give to that proposal.
How far beyond inquiry into facts can these interrogatories go? Opinions
as to the speed a defendant was traveling or intending to travel at the time of a
collision,99 as to whether an estate was solvent,' 0 or as to a party's classification
of his injuries as temporary or permanent and approximation of the date of
partial or complete recovery' 0 ' have been held to be matters of opinion and unable to be discovered. Questions asking a party to state what acts of a defendant are complained of as patent infringements,0 2 or whether a party contended that an adverse party was in default at any time that he was a tenant0 3
have been held improper as asking for a legal contention or conclusion. Most
of the opinions give no explanation for their decision, except the general proposition that the discovery process is meant solely to lead to the ascertainment of
facts. On the other hand, courts have held inquiries proper in situations not
95 Id. at 18. The other dissenting justices were Black, Douglas and Murphy.
96 There has been a fear as to the propriety of imposing sanctions on non-parties who
fail to submit to physical examinations. The proposed amendment does not provide for
sanctions against non-parties, but only against those parties who fail in good faith to produce
the non-parties for examination. See Proposed Amendments 266-67.
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
98 C. WmrGHT, supra note 22, § 86, at 330.
99 Moorman v. Simon, 8 F.R.D. 328 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
100 Wolf v. United Air Lines, 9 F.R.D. 271 '(M.D. Pa. 1949).
101 Lowe v. Greyhound Corp., 25 F. Supp. 643 (D. Mass. 1938).
102 Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 25 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1938).
103 Caggiano v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 27 F. Supp. 240 (D. Mass. 1939).
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legally distinguishable from the above-mentioned decisions.;' 4 In a patent suit
which allowed an answer to an interrogatory as to whether a drawing that
formed part of the patent in suit correctly illustrated the fabric described and
claimed as plaintiff's invention, the court stated:
Why should the plaintiff at this time refuse to say what he thinks about
it or what he will contend? If both parties agree that it is incorrect, a
long step towards simplification will have been taken. If they do not agree,
then there will be testimony, expert and otherwise, upon that point at the
trial and nothing will have been lost. The plaintiff's objections to answering
this interrogatory seem to me to be the last word in technicality and entirely out of touch with the spirit of the new rules. 0 5
With the opinion rule in evidence under formal attack, 0 6 it is apparent that
there is an increasing recognition that the difference between fact and opinion
or conclusion is a difference of degree rather than of kind. This has been recognized by many other courts which have held: that a factual opinion or contention can be discovered, but a legal theory cannot;' 7 that interrogatories as to
mixed conclusions of fact and law are valid;18 and that the eliciting of conclusions
as incidental to evidentiary facts is proper. 09 It is to solve the direct dilemma of
conflicting decisions and the increasing liberality in the development of intermediate grounds such as "factual opinions" that the following amendment to
Rule 33 is proposed:
Interrogatoriesmay relate to any matters which can be inquired into
under Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to the 'extent permitted
by the rules of evidence.
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not objectionable merely because
an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion, contentation, or legal
conclusion, but the court may order that such an interrogatorybe answered
at a later time, or after designated discovery has been completed, or at a
pre-trial conference."10
In allowing interrogatories to opinions, there can be no objection that these are
now to be admissible in evidence, for the rule explicitly states otherwise. Nor
should it be an objection that these should not be discovered because the purpose of discovery is the discovery of admissible evidence. Prior to the use of the
language in Rule 26(b) that "[i]t is not ground for objection that the testimony
will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,""' it was well recognized
that the narrowing of the issues was also a main purpose of discovery." As to
contentions and legal conclusions, interrogatories to these can also be used in
104

For a listing of cases so holding, see 2A
§ 768 (Wright ed. 1961).

BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE

105

Schwartz v. Howard Hosiery Co., 27 F. Supp. 443, 444 '(E.D. Pa. 1939).

106 See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, at §§ 11-12.
107 Zinsky v. New York Cent. R.R., 36 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
108 Bullard v. Universal Millwork Corp., 25 F.R.D. 342, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
109 Banana Service Co. v. United Fruit Co., 15 F.R.D. 106, 109-10 (D. Mass. 1953).

110 Proposed Amendments 251-52.
111 Fa. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
112

For further discussion of this -point, see MooRE § 33.17, at 2354-55.
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narrowing and sharpening the issues. This fundamental purpose of discovery
needs little more defense than mentioning that in federal jurisdiction the old
theory of pleading is dead, replaced by liberality in pleadings. If a party wishes
further information about the claim asserted against him it is well recognized that
he is to use the elaborate discovery rules developed for him. To the extent that
interrogatories are used to clarify the contentions of the parties, they are an
adjunct to the pleadings, and parties are not held rigidly within the limits of
their pleadings when a case comes to trial. Mention in the amendment is made
of the pre-trial conference provided for in Rule 16, and that this is another useful
device in the clarification and simplification of the issues before trial. Though
the amendment will not allow the discretionary conference to carry the whole
burden of discovering contentions and conclusions now that the theory of pleading has received its appropriate burial, provision is made for a delay of discovery
if a dispute can best be resolved in the presence of a judge.
One fear in the old theory of pleading days was that a party, once having
stated his case in the pleadings, became bound to what he had said. An argument has been made that the cases allowing interrogatories as to contentions
have revived, under a different name, a particular pleading-the unlamented bill
of particulars-which was abolished in 1948."' To this fear the commentaries
have said that the general rule governing the use of answers to interrogatories is
that under ordinary circumstances they do not limit proof. They cite the case of
McElroy v. United Air Lines, Inc.,"1 4 which said that the parties should not be
bound by these answers, if, in the interim between answering time and trial,
they obtain by subsequent investigation new or additional facts. The parties will
not be prevented from offering this further information at trial. 115 With this as
a background, it should be clear to an interrogating party that he should not be
entitled to rely on the unchanging character of the answers he receives, and that
argument of imposing an "unchangeable theory" upon a party by using the discovery devices will not receive judicial approval.
VI. Rule 36 -

Requests for Admissions of Opinions

Present Rule 36(a) allows a party to serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission of the genuineness of any relevant documents or the
truth of any relevant matter of fact." 6 Its purpose is to expedite the trial by
relieving the parties of the expense, both in time and in cost, of proving facts
113 See James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules, 71 HAsv. L.
RBV. 1473, 1474 (1958) where the author stated:
The substance of what is sought is the same. These rulings do not call for facts as
a witness would give them, from observation or knowledge, but for the contentions
or claims of fact selected, combined and stated in terms of their legal consequences,
as a pleader would set them forth. Contentions need not rest on a party's personal
knowledge or observation, nor reflect the party's own selection or judgment. Indeed
they will often represent instead the work product of his lawyer. Of just such stuff
are bills of particulars made.
114 21 F.R.D. 100 (W.D. Mo. 1957). There the court emphasized that "[t]he discovery
rules are not to be employed as a stratagem to maneuver an adverse party into an unfavorable position." Id. at 102.
115 See Committee's Notes 254.
116 FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
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which will not be disputed at trial. The existing requirement is that the matters
to be admitted be "of fact." Though the question is perhaps not as broad as the
discovery device of Rule 33, for there only information is sought and not a verification of the truth of something already apparent, there have been conflicts in the
judicial decisions as to whether a request to admit matters of opinion and matters
involving mixed law and fact is proper under the rule."' As to both categories,
decisions can be found going either way, though the majority of courts seem to
sustain objections as to admissions of mixed law and fact. For example, in
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Norton Company," a
patent infringement action, the plaintiff sought to have the defendant admit to
comments about an opinion which involved a legal conclusion as to a critical
issue in the lawsuit. In denying this request, the court stated that "[t]he liberal
limits of discovery under the Federal Rules have not wholly eliminated surprise,
but have only eliminated unfair surprise.""' 9 Apart from the difficulty in separating the Rules' requirement of a fact from an opinion or legal conclusion,
there is a more positive reason for allowing admissions of this latter nature.
Though a matter of opinion may facilitate proof, even more significant is the
fact that admissions of matter involving law as well as fact may clearly narrow
the issues in any litigation. The commentaries mention a good case in point" °
that involved an action against a general contractor and others for damages for
the death of a subcontractor's employee on a construction site. On the eve of
trial, the plaintiff affirmatively answered a request for an admission of a defendant to the effect that "[a]t the time of the accident in suit, the premises on
which said accident occurred were occupied or under the control of defendant
John McShain, Inc.""' The plaintiff had originally denied this request by an
answer filed more than a year before. This admission involving law as well as
fact thus removed one of the issues from the lawsuit, and thereby reduced the
proof required at trial. 2
In order to avoid considerable litigation, comment, and frustration, the
proposed amendment broadens the scope of admissions under Rule 36 as follows:
A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request, including
the genuineness of any documents described in the request.13
This recognizes that the nice distinctions between facts and conclusions are un117 As to opinions, compare, e.g. Jackson Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139 '(E.D.N.Y.
1957), with, e.g., Photon, Inc. v. Harris Intertype, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 327 (D. Mass. 1961).
In the latter decision, the court discarded some requests as opinions and held another group
answerable, citing the approach of Professor Moore: "Where the borderline of fact and
opinion is shadowy . . . the preferable course would be to hold that the request requires an
answer." . . . Id. at 328, quoting from § 36.04, at 2713.
118 36 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
119 Id. at 3.
120 McSparran v. Hannigan, 225 F. Supp 628 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
121 Id. at 636.
122 This admission was conclusive as to McShain's liability, for once control of the premises
was established, he was to be designated a statutory employer and thus immune from common
law claims for negligence. Id. at 635.
123 Proposed Amendments 260.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[October, 1968]

workable and unjustified, and that certain inquiries beyond simple facts can serve
the judicial process by pinpointing issues as well as by saving time and money.
Under court supervision, no longer will it be necessary to indulge in the fantasies
of separating law from fact. The only requirement for an admission will be that
it be relevant to the subject matter of the pending action 4
VII. Conclusion
A fundamental purpose of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure has been to reduce the "sporting element" of litigation. It is
evident that the broader expansion of the scope of discovery through the proposed amendments is in keeping with this purpose. Discovery of insurance policy
limits, allowing interrogatories and admissions to proceed beyond mere facts,
eliminating the strict requirement of good cause for discovery of another party's
documents (and distinguishing these from trial preparation materials), and providing access to an adversary's expert witnesses, will reinforce this fundamental
purpose. Still, the fact that these changes will further eliminate the guessing
game will be more a result of their approval than a reason for it.
Substantive reasons for acceptance of the amendments, however, also exist.
First, the suggestions discussed and analyzed in this Note are not wholly new
and unforeseen changes in the scope of pre-trial discovery. The amendments, as
can readily be seen, have their origin in the case law. The positions taken have
been presented and accepted by district courts throughout the federal system.
Yet for every decision used as authority for the amendments' positions, there is
a decision on the books which would support a different, or even contrary, position. It is in this dilemma that there lies a second reason for their acceptance:
clarification of the existing decisions. It is undisputed that uniformity in procedure should be the goal of the federal judicial system. This is essential both
for the betterment of the system itself, and for the litigants who seek justice
within it. No party should be provided a procedural right in one federal court
and denied the same right in another. No litigant should be left in the dark as
to the procedural aspects of his lawsuit, with the result that procedural disputes
turn into costly and alarming controversies themselves.
But to savor amendment for the clarification it brings cannot be the ultimate reason for approval of these particular amendments. The final and conclusive basis for urging approval must come from the merit of the positions taken
in the provisions themselves. The only remedy for positions without merit if such be the case - is for the Advisory Committee to return to their drafting
boards and try again. Yet it is the feeling of this author that these amendments
cannot be assailed for the positions taken. The tests for merit must be the measures
of fairness, justice, and efficiency, and these have been the standards that have
guided the Advisory Committee. Difficulty in making distinctions between facts
and opinions and conclusions prompts the expansion of interrogatories and
admissions beyond mere inquiries as to facts. Usefulness of blood tests and of
physical examinations of non-parties in certain instances necessitates a change in
124
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Rule 35. The same holds true for discovery of insurance policies. Elimination
of any showing of a requirement beyond relevancy to the subject matter for
production of a party's documents is matched by the proposed incorporation of
the Hickman v. Taylor doctrine into the Rules themselves, and by an extension
of that doctrine to trial preparation materials formulated by non-attorneys. Here,
as with the provision on discovery of an expert's information, a balance has been
stuck between the desire for openness and the justice owed a paying, working
party. Justice, too, has been a matter of degree. The amendments provide for
a very limited discovery of an expert's information, but for a broader discovery
of an expert's identity and subject matter when he is also to be a witness. Safeguards then, in the name of justice and fairness to litigants, are provided not
only in a position allowing or not allowing discovery, but also in protective devices
within these positions.
In the end, each member of the bench and practicing bar must familiarize
himself with the present provisions and existing case law, the proposed amendments offered, and the changes and/or improvements each has made. It is to
this familiarization that this Note has ultimately been directed. At the outset,
initial praise was offered for the amendments as meaningful elements of clarification. It is only after a thorough analysis that this author urges final praise in
the form of approval, acceptance and implementation.
James E. Mackin

